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This paper conducts an analysis of the water markets in Victoria covered by 
Watermove. The analysis in this paper examines the weekly trading activity across 
trading zones. For the majority of trading zones there is little trading activity that 
occurs. There are three trading zones in which the markets for temporary water rights 
are reasonably active and liquid on a weekly basis, and for these zones an analysis is 
conducted of their demand and supply elasticities and consumer and producer surplus. 
The results of this analysis suggest a stronger relationship on the supply side between 
prices, volumes, elasticity and producer surplus.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
A major issue in the economic analysis of environmental problems relates to the 
allocation of property rights in the underlying resource. In recent times, a major 
emphasis of the literature has been on the allocation of such rights to individuals and 
then allowing the market trading of these rights to determine valuations. One of the 
major environmental issues in the Australian context is water. The ability to trade 
water in Victoria was introduced as a result of an overall policy of rationalisation in 
all areas of the economy during the early 1980s.  Historically, water allocation and 
pricing in Victoria was controlled by government.  Rationalisation included 
deregulation of industries as well as an increase in the accountability of public sector 
organisations.  Prior to the initiation of this reform process water management in 
Victoria had failed to incorporate sound financial management practices with revenue 
failing to meet the costs of total cost of water supply including maintenance and 
management of infrastructure (Harris, 2002; 2004a; 2004b).  During the reform 
process it was well recognised by policy makers that there needed to be a substantive 
shift toward a management system that incorporated considerations of scarcity within 
the now, mature water sector.  Primarily, it was the recognition of increasing water 
scarcity that prompted policy debate around the issue of whether traditional regulatory 
approaches could provide for socially optimal water use that led directly to a re-
examination of water rights (Pigram, 1993: 1314/5).  As a result of this re-
examination, the Victorian Government recognised the need to remove the historical 
nexus between land ownership and water rights.  This was achieved via the passing of 
the Water Act (1989) to permit temporary and permanent trades of water rights within 
Victorian irrigation districts.   
 
The trading of water in Victoria and Southern New South Wales is facilitated through 
Watermove and details are provided on the Watermove website 
(http://www.watermove.com.au/). Water trading is conducted within trading zones 
which are detailed on the Watermove website. While there are restrictions on who can 
trade in the market, the existence of the market does provide information on the 
valuation placed by individuals on the available water resource. 
 
Recent literature relating to the introduction and evolution of water markets in 
Australia has focused on a number of relevant, and interrelated issues that must be 
considered for the full benefits of water markets to be forthcoming.  Issues 
surrounding further clarification of property rights, negative third party effects, 
interregional trade restrictions, infrastructure cost sharing, and regulatory restrictions 
increasing transaction costs associated with trading have been the subject of much 
discussion and analysis (Brennan and Scoccimarro (1999), Campbell (2004), 
Freebairn (2004), Harris (2002), Crase, O’Rielly and Dollery (2000), and Hentley, 
Thorpe, Klijn, Beare, and Want (2004)).  Nevertheless, most writers recognise a 
fundamental positive benefit from a shift toward water markets in Australia that will 
continue to accrue as knowledge and information regarding possible ways of dealing 
with the above concerns evolves parallel to the growth of markets.   
 
One of the most often cited positive benefits accruing from water markets is the 
efficiency gains within sectors adding to societal wealth.  Efficiency gains can result 
in considerable structural adjustment within the economy resulting in an industry 
profile more favourable for long term growth.  However, structural change is only one aspect deserving consideration by market proponents.  Other important benefits 
stemming from the creation and liberalisation of markets should also receive attention 
from analysts such as, the avoidance of government failure and increased innovation 
and entrepreneurship (Rolfe, 2004).  This paper will add weight to the discussion 
regarding the potential positive affects that accrue from water markets focusing on the 
positive effects for the environment.  Improvements in environmental outcomes can 
be considered the secondary effects of those benefits mentioned above.  However, in 
light of the challenge environmental degradation has posed for the Australian 
agricultural sector, the attenuation of the severity of these problems via the use of 
markets is of considerable significance. 
 
Bell (2002) discusses the role of trading houses in facilitating environmentally 
sustainable trade.  In this stylised model trading houses act as single suppliers of 
tradable water within a river system attenuating salinity via the maintenance of higher 
than atomistic market prices.  The positive effects limiting salinity will accrue within 
this model only under the presence of a number of key assumptions.  First, 
characteristics of the upstream and downstream salinity levels where it is assumed 
that downstream groundwater levels are already high (Bell, 2002: 350).  Second, 
salinity cost and benefit information is assumed to be diffuse within an atomistic 
market.  This leaves little room to consider the effects of price increases associated 
with an atomistic market that can result in individual farmers internalising the benefits 
and costs of their water use, this includes the impacts of salinity on their property.  If 
all farmers noted the costs of excessive water usage in relation to salinity individually, 
they would choose to reduce their usage regardless of what others within the system 
are doing.  The aggregate results would be an overall reduction in salinity at all points 
along the river system.  Third, within Bell’s (2002) analysis there is an underlying 
assumption that while the information on salinity costs and benefits are diffuse in an 
atomistic market the trading house knows perfectly these costs and benefits.  The 
difficulty with this assumption is that there is little evidence to suggest full 
information on the part of any actor within an economic system.  Moreover, this 
argument ignores the potential for failure on the part of the trading house, which could 
be seen as analogous to government failure as there would be a high potential for 
capture of trading house administrators by interest groups.  Why the characteristics of 
a trading house would be immune to these effects is not addressed.   
 
However, while this highly stylised model cannot provide evidence of the impacts 
trading houses would have on salinity levels in practice, it does highlight the 
importance of market design options adopted and notes the impending creation of 
Watermove arrangements in Victoria and southern New South Wales to facilitate 
trade.  Freebairn (2004) also highlights the possible solutions available from 
electronic trade arrangement of which Watermove is one type.  In line with these 
studies this paper conducts an analysis of the water markets that are part of 
Watermove to provide a greater understanding between the potential provided by 
market based solutions to environmental problems. 
 
The operation of water markets on a weekly basis in Watermove enables an analysis 
of how an atomistic market structure has worked. Specifically, analysis can be 
undertaken on prices and quantities traded, associated demand and supply elasticities, 
as well as the surpluses that flow to buyers and sellers from the operation of the market. The analysis could also allow speculation on the possibility of positive 
environmental consequences from such trading. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section two considers the connection between the 
historical institutional framework and the rise of salinity in Victoria’s irrigation areas.  
Section three provides basic details on the operation of the water markets, and some 
summary statistics on trading activity. Section four presents an analysis of estimated 
demand and supply elasticities for the three markets/products in which there is more 
active trading activity. Section five contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Historical institutional inefficiencies and degradation 
 
Within the current institutional framework, an analysis of the impacts of markets on 
environmental outcomes is limited to consideration of decreases in salinity rather than 
an increase in amounts of water provided for instream flows that would necessarily 
improve environmental outcomes.  The discussion is limited due to the current 
regulatory limitations on those who may buy and sell rights within water markets 
(Harris, 2002).  Specifically, environmental groups are unable to enter the market and 
buy rights for the provision of instream flows.  In turn, this had led the government to 
consider administrative intervention in order to satisfy these stakeholder preferences. 
While there has been no significant attempts to do this so far, the reality is that unless 
the government is subject to the same rules of trading as are existing market 
participants, these efforts will destabilise the market and result in increased 
uncertainty regarding security of property rights for existing users (Harris, 2002; 
Moran, 2003).  Hence, because there is little capacity for the current market to 
account for consumer preferences to allocate water to instream flows these potential 
benefits cannot currently be realised and the discussion must be restricted to the 
consequences of markets for salination.  However, before a discussion of the current 
state of water markets and the positive results they may yield both economically and 
environmentally, there must be some consideration of how historical institutional 
structures contributed to both economic inefficiencies and environmental degradation. 
 
Analysis of historical institutional frameworks used to allocate and price water within 
Victoria reveals considerable bias toward government intervention.  In terms of this 
institutional history there have been a number of alternative methods used by 
government to maintain control over the water sector.  This preference for control 
stemmed from two major, interconnected factors: the reliance on the agricultural 
sector to drive economic development, and the limitations imposed on this sector by 
the effects of constant, crippling drought.  What is most interesting about the history 
of the water sector within Victoria is the lack of acknowledgement of the considerable 
negative economic and environmental consequences brought about by government 
intervention that prevented the evolution of water markets from very early in the 
states history (Harris, 2002).  Evidence of these consequences provides support for the 
contention that until the introduction of water markets, the water sector was a victim 
of government failure (Harris, 2002; 2004a). 
 
Phases of water allocation and pricing in Victorian can be broken into 4 distinct 
periods: domination of the British common law of riparian rights (1800-1882); the 
introduction of decentralised control under irrigation trusts (1883-1904); centralisation under the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (1905-1983); and 
the move to water markets (1984-present).  Each phase had distinct impacts on the 
economic efficiency of the water sector and environmental degradation, with the most 
substantive effects accruing in the second and third phases when government control 
reached its peak.  In addition, the premature introduction of government intervention 
during the second phase in the 1880s resulted in the stifling of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in water development that prevented the evolution of water markets 
via the adaptation of property rights (Harris, 2004b).  As a result, without user 
property rights adaptation that may have led to the introduction of water markets 
much earlier in Victoria’s history, the inefficiencies within the water sector and the 
resultant environmental degradation accelerated over time.  These connections are 
discussed below. 
 
The first phase of water development dominated by the British common law of 
riparian rights did not result in substantive increases in salinity over the period 
primarily due to the limited development of water supplies by settlers.  During this 
period, squatters’ dominated settlement expansion and much of their activities were 
limited to pastoral pursuits, that is, sheep grazing.  While squatters’ faced 
considerable risk and uncertainty associated with rainfall variation rather than 
adapting water rights to suit environmental conditions vastly different from those of 
their homeland, like that which occurred in the western United States with the prior 
appropriation doctrine, squatters’ instead made limited improvements to sure up water 
supplies via the construction of dams and the sinking of wells and bores (Harris, 
2004b).  These activities were complimented by the inherent mobility sheep grazing 
provided and the scattering of run ownership that allowed squatters to protect 
themselves against the effects of regional drought.  Conflicts over water rights were 
not common in Victoria during this period, with little evidence of either violence or 
defence via the legal system.  This was most likely the result of low demand for water 
due to the limited number of settlers’ in the more remote areas of the colony 
compared with supply (Harris, 2002, 2004b).  However, institutional equilibrium was 
shattered by the discovery of gold at Bendigo in 1851. 
 
Gold mining brought a substantive increase in population during the 1850s as 
migrants came to make their fortune on the lucrative Victorian gold fields.  Once the 
technologically available supplies of gold were exhausted for the capital poor, smaller 
miner, the government was faced with a significant challenge of employment for the 
vastly increased population.  As a result, land reform was almost inevitable with the 
establishment of a viable agricultural sector being considered the most effective way 
to utilise this increased population in an under developed economy.  To these ends the 
colonial government enacted legislation to unlock the lands, attempting to remove the 
squatter monopoly and replace it with a class of small, yeoman settlers.  This period is 
referred to as the selection era and, while considered a failure by contemporary 
analysts (Fitzpatrick (1969), Powell (1970), Dingle (1984)) it did focus legislators’ 
attention on the limitations rainfall variability caused for the small settler.  Prior to 
these developments, policy makers’ water supply development attempts were limited 
to the provision of supply on the gold fields.  These efforts had no impact on settlers 
located outside populous mining districts (Harris, 2002). Nonetheless, the relative 
increase in population in the more arid parts of the colony, and the possible impact of 
an electoral backlash should government inaction on the water supply question 
continue, shook the government out its complacency (Powell, 1989; Harris, 2004b).  
Initially, water supply development efforts were concentrated on the provision of 
domestic and stock supply to small regional centres with the Water Conservation and 
Distribution Act (1881) providing the organisational framework and finance for 
development of local schemes to be managed by settlers themselves.  However, this 
had little impact on the riparian doctrine with local bodies referred to as waterworks 
trusts being given the right to access a certain quantity of water from a specific 
source(s) via legislation.  Nonetheless, this period did signal a shift in philosophy 
regarding water supply development that led to more significant changes in the 
decades that followed with a shift in focus toward the possibilities irrigation provided 
to drought-proof settlers.  Alfred Deakin was the primary supporter of irrigation 
development in the colony.  Deakin aroused the public and parliamentary interest in 
the advantages irrigation provided to protect the embryonic agricultural industry from 
the devastating effects of drought.  By the mid-1880s Deakin had chaired a Royal 
Commission the findings of which became the basis for the Irrigation Act (1886) that 
radically altered the water rights framework in Victoria.  This new framework ushered 
in a period of government intervention and control that was to dominate water rights 
development in the state for the next one hundred years.  In turn, these developments 
would forever alter the Victorian landscape and lead to devastating environmental 
effects with the rise of salinity that would come to threaten the continued productivity 
of the agricultural sector.   
 
The causal links between irrigation and salinity are well known.  However, analysis of 
the links between the institutional framework and environmental effects has had little 
attention.  Findings in Harris (2002) indicate a direct causal relationship between the 
institutional setting and the rise of salinity within Victoria over the periods being 
discussed here.  Primarily, the institutional framework was characterised by the lack 
of ability to trade water rights and prices being set by government at levels that could 
not cover the cost of supply, maintenance, and management of irrigation systems.  In 
turn, individual farmers did not internalise the cost and benefits of their resource use 
leading to distorted incentives that promoted over use and lack of innovation.  In 
addition, the inability of farmers to sell their water rights separately from the land to 
which it was attached reinforced this incentive structure, as farmers were unable to be 
flexible in their production decisions.  This resulted in the rise of inefficiencies that 
have come to dominate the irrigation sector with production of low value crops on 
marginal lands.  It is these effects that led to the rise of salination that may have been 
avoided if the evolution of institutions and property rights framework had been 
permitted to take place from the bottom-up.   
 
The Irrigation Act (1886) provided for management of irrigation schemes by local 
districts under bodies referred to as irrigation trusts.  The state treasury provided 
finance with water rates revenue being used to pay back government loans and the 4% 
interest charged.  However, it was not long before this system began to show signs of 
financial strain as farmers refused to pay their water rates resulting in trusts being 
unable to pay back even the interest on government loans (Harris, 2002; 2004b).   
Financial problems were combined with poor local management and high levels of 
uncertainty regarding water rights.  Water rights uncertainty stemmed from the fact 
that farmers were only guaranteed their rights for a maximum of 14 years (Martin, 
1955).  As a result, farmers had no incentive to invest the considerable sums required 
for successful irrigation.  Combined with lack of access to markets for produce and lack of knowledge regarding irrigation methods, these factors all led to the quick 
demise of the trust system culminating in its financial collapse at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
 
During this initial phase of irrigation development, salination began to be identified 
on a small number of farms.  However, there was a lack of understanding between the 
excess watering taking place with irrigation and salinity.  Farmers who identified salt 
intrusion on their land were unsure whether it was a direct consequence of irrigation, 
and due to the small number of settlers that were affected, these early signs of the 
problems to come did not lead to any substantial scientific investigation to assess the 
impacts of irrigation on salinity (Harris, 2002). 
 
While the failure of the trust system indicated irrigation was introduced prematurely 
in Victoria’s history, the faith of policy makers in the possibilities irrigation provided 
for decreasing the risks associated with drought in the agricultural sector remained 
unwavering.  Further, it was considered that the system of decentralised management 
was the real cause of the failure therefore, if the institutional framework was altered 
the creation of a large-scale irrigation sector that would become the backbone of the 
agricultural sector would become a reality.  Hence, in 1905 another legislative 
enactment, the Water Act, ushered in a move to fully centralised control of water 
allocation and pricing under the auspices of a newly created body known as the State 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission (SWRSC).  The SRWSC would come to 
dominate the institutional landscape for water development within the state for the 
next eighty years.  It was during this period that environmental consequences of 
irrigation induced salinity on both the land and in river systems accelerated with 
devastating consequences for regional areas. 
 
The SRWSC was the first statutory body of its type in the world, imbued with the 
power of government combined with the initiative of the private sector (East, 1962).  
Under SRWSC control, the irrigation sector grew at a phenomenal pace with storage 
capacity increasing from 701, 700 in 1918/19 to 10,390,740 megalitres in 1983/84 and 
the land under irrigation agriculture growing from 108,059 acres in 1906/07 to 
1,416,355 acres in 1983/84 (SRWSC, 1906/07 to 1983/84).  While growth of the 
irrigation sector under the SRWSC was remarkable, the underlying institutional 
structure promoted substantial inefficiencies within this sector that resulted in 
considerable negative environmental effects.  However, before the discussion 
considers the environmental costs of irrigation salinity an outline of the institutional 
framework of the SRWSC is required. 
 
The institutional framework to develop the irrigation sector under the 1905 Act had 
two main features: a compulsory charge and the inability to sell water rights 
separately from the land to which they were attached.  First, the compulsory charge 
required farmers to pay for a minimum amount of water regardless of whether they 
used it or not.  In addition, this charge was set at a level that could not recoup the 
costs associated with supply, management, and maintenance of the irrigation sector 
(Harris, 2002; 2004a; 2004b).  As a result, a significant proportion of the cost of 
irrigation was transferred to urban areas while the benefits were concentrated on 
regional areas.  In turn, farmers were unable to internalise the full costs and benefits 
of their water use leading inefficiencies to dominate the sector with the expansion of 
irrigated farming on marginal lands with soils unsuited to intensive agriculture and the focus of production on low valued crops the prices for which fluctuated widely on the 
world market.  Excessive watering also mobilised salinity naturally occurring in the 
landscape leading to an increase in the incidence of shallow water tables as additional 
moisture added to groundwater levels bringing them closer to the surface.  Additional 
water also mobilised salt within the soil bringing it to the surface and adding to stream 
salinity levels via return flows.  These effects, while natural occurrences during the 
irrigation process were exacerbated by the fact that farmers had no incentive to 
minimise their water usage nor innovate to create more efficient irrigation 
technologies that could limit the damage being caused.  Second, the inability of 
farmers to sell water separately from the land to which it was attached reinforced a 
lack of flexibility inherent in the system with farmers being locked into irrigated 
production.  As a result, distorted incentives came to dominate the system and 
promote inefficiencies.   
 
The political system simply supported the inherent problems of the water sector under 
the SRWSC, with the electoral system concentrating power in rural areas (Harris, 
2002; 2004a).  Specifically, while the majority of population was located in urban 
areas, 36 out of 75 seats in the Legislative Assembly were decided in rural areas.  In 
addition, the ratio of vote values indicates consistently higher values associated with 
rural votes compared with urban (Hay, Hallinger, Warhurst, and Coster, 1985: 15) 
reinforcing the political systems bias and the continuation of favourable water pricing 
policies that underpinned growth in the irrigation sector (Harris, 2002: 142). 
 
Together the political and institutional framework that dominated water exploitation 
for the bulk of the twentieth century led to the creation of a system that encouraged 
inefficient and wasteful water usage practices.  In turn, the institutional framework 
provided users with an incentive structure that promoted degradation rather than 
preservation.  Only recent reforms aimed at the creation of water markets and 
complimented by a restriction on diversions (the Cap), and the Salinity Debit and 
Credit scheme have gone part way to redressing this imbalance and limiting further 
salination of Victoria’s irrigation districts and river systems.  Water markets will be 
the key to driving the reduction in salinity as they will result in higher prices that will 
lead to a reallocation of water away from less efficient producers and ensure farmers 
internalise the full environmental costs and benefits of their water use.  An analysis of 
the current state of the market using the data from Watermove will provide a more 
complete picture of the extent of potential environmental benefits. 
 
 
3. Water  Markets 
 
 
The water exchanges conducted in Watermove are divided into six regions as follows: 
 
Northern Victoria Groundwater; Northern Victoria Regulated; Northern Victoria 
Unregulated; Southern New South Wales; Southern Victoria Regulated; and 
Wimmera Mallee.  
 
Within each of the six regions there is a further division into trading zones. The 
number of trading zones in each region are detailed in table 1. The products traded 
include Temporary Water Rights/Diversion Licence (TWRDL), Temporary Sales (TS), Temporary High Security (THS), Temporary General Security (TGS), 
Permanent Used Water Right/Diversion Licence (PWRDL), and Permanent Unused 
Water Right/Diversion Licence (PUWRDL). Details on the regions, trading zones and 
products traded are obtained from the Watermove website 
(http://www.watermove.com.au/).  
 
Trading is restricted to those individuals who are supplied water from certain water 
authorities and there are restrictions on who can trade with whom in particular zones. 




For each trading zone traders are able to submit their offers by mail, fax or online. 
According to the trading rules, pool prices and water exchanges are conducted on the 
following basis. Sellers will be considered on an ascending price basis. The lowest 
price seller within a trading zone shall be the first seller eligible to trade. The highest 
price seller within a trading zone will be the last seller eligible to trade. Buyers will be 
considered on a descending price basis. The highest price buyer within a trading zone 
shall be the first buyer eligible to trade. The lowest price buyer within a trading zone 
will be the last buyer eligible to trade. 
 
The pool price for a trading zone is then calculated to maximise the volume of water 
traded (subject to any limit for that particular zone) and is calculated to clear the 
market. In a number of trading weeks the market clears with sell and buy offers at the 
pool price. However in some trading weeks, the market clears by establishing a pool 
price by averaging sell and buy offers and in these cases the pool price is calculated 
by averaging the sale and buy prices of the last successful traders respectively so as to 
apportion any price benefits equally these sellers and buyers. Trading is conducted on 
a weekly basis and typically takes place at 10am on a Thursday, with results notified 
by noon, unless impacted by a public holiday. Offers need to be lodged by noon on 
Monday (although they can be cancelled up to noon on Wednesday). These details are 
available on the website at:  
http://www.watermove.com.au/aboutwatertrading.asp#how_water_move_works 
 
For each trading zone data was collected on the price history for that trading zone 
from the relevant section of the Watermove website 
(http://www.watermove.com.au/selectregion.asp?next=results/pricehistoryforzone.asp
) for the period from August 22 2002 to March 17 2005. For the majority of trading 
zones there is little (or no) trading activity. In Northern Victoria Groundwater there 
are only 4 weeks in February/March 2003 in which offers are lodged for TWRDL for 
Spring Hill Groundwater and in only one of these weeks (13/3/03) does trading occur 
with 25 ML traded at a price of $20. In Northern Victoria Unregulated there is slightly 
more trading activity. For 11 of the trading zones no offers are recorded. For the 
Lower Campaspe River there are 2 weeks in April 2004 that produce offers for 
TWRDL. For the Lower Loddon Unregulated there are 4 weeks in February/March 
2005 that produce offers for PUWRDL. However in these two zones no trades ever 
occur. For Goulburn Unregulated there are 8 weeks that produce offers from August 
to October 2004 for PUWRDL, and in one of these weeks (16/9/04) trading occurs 
with 32 ML traded at a price of $1150. For Kiewa Main Stem there are 6 weeks in 
September/October 2002 and 14 weeks from January to April 2004 that produce offers for TWRDL. For three of these weeks trading occurs. On September 19 2002 - 
40 ML are traded for $46, on October 3 2002 – 10 ML traded for $46, and on April 8 
2004 – 25 ML traded for $21. In Southern New South Wales there is no trading that 
occurs, although there is one week for Hume to Barmah (10A) in April 2003 and 4 
weeks for Murray Irrigation Limited (10B) from December 2003 to February 2004 
that offers occur. In Wimmera Mallee there are no offers in any weeks. In Southern 
Victoria Regulated there is no trading in 7 of the 9 trading zones, although two of 
these zones show limited offers for the TWRDL. There are two trading zones in 
Southern Victoria Regulated for which trading activity takes place. These are for 4 
weeks for the Werribee System (31) for TWRDL, and for 5 weeks for Lower LaTrobe 
(43) for TWRDL. For the Werribee System prices range from $195 (23/12/04) to 
$1050 (22/1/04) while the amounts traded range from 5.1ML (19/2/04) to 46.6 ML 
(27/2/03). For Lower LaTrobe prices range from $13 (29/5/03, 12/6/03) to $20 
(11/3/04), while the amounts traded range from 50ML (11/3/04) to 300ML (24/7/03).  
 
The only region where there is significant trading activity is Northern Victoria 
Regulated. For 13 of the 23 trading zones there are no trades that occur, although in 
many of these zones there are a number of weeks in which offers are made. There are 
a further 10 zones where there are 11 particular products that trade for 9 weeks or less 
in the sample period. The details for these trading zones are presented in table 2. 
These zones trade both temporary and permanent water rights. Consistent with 
expectations the prices for trading permanent water rights are significantly higher. In 
fact for the 23 weeks of trading activity in these products summarised in table 3 there 
is only a single week where the price is less than $1000. The trade of temporary water 
rights is done at lower prices, although there is considerable variation in these prices 
from a low of $15 to a high of $450. In these zones and products with a limited 
number of trading weeks there are only small quantities of ML traded from a low of 
2ML to a high of 200ML. 
 
There are however three zones in which there is reasonably consistent trading activity 
in the Northern Victoria Regulated region. These zones are Greater Goulburn, Hume-
Barmah and Barmah-Nyah. In all three of these zones TWRDL have been traded for 
most weeks across the three financial years that Watermove has been operational. For 
Hume-Barmah and Barmah-Nyah there is also a reasonable number of trading weeks 
in TS in 2002/03, and for Greater Goulburn there is a scattering of weeks across the 
three financial years for PUWRDL. For these three zones and six products the results 
in table 3 report the number of weeks in which trading activity occurs, the number of 
weeks in which offers are made but no trades occur, the number of weeks in which no 
offers are made, the minimum and maximum values for prices and ML traded across 
the trading weeks, the average ML traded in a trading week, the simple average price 
for trading weeks and the weighted average price for trading weeks where the weights 
are calculated as a function of the ML traded. For the sake of completeness table 3 
also includes the averages and ranges for prices and ML traded for all other zones 
combined into two groups trading of temporary and permanent water rights.  
 
An analysis of the results in table 3 reveals the following patterns. For the Greater 
Goulburn trading zone there are 108 trading weeks, for the Hume-Barmah trading 
zone there are 85 trading weeks and for the Barmah-Nyah trading zone there are 118 
trading weeks. The number of weeks in which no offers are received is very small, in 
fact, only a single figure number for all zones. The Hume-Barmah zone has a higher number of non-trading weeks than the other zones. The minimum prices across all 
trading weeks are similar across the three zones, while the maximum price for Greater 
Goulburn is higher than the other two zones. In terms of simple average prices Greater 
Goulburn is higher than the other two zones. However when prices are weighted by 
volumes traded average prices in Greater Goulburn and Barmah-Nyah are very 
similar, with weighted average prices in Hume-Barmah a bit lower. Figure 1 presents 
a graph of prices in the three zones across the sample period which illustrates the price 
variability that occurs. In terms of ML traded Greater Goulburn is by far the most 
liquid market with an average ML traded almost five times as large as that in the other 
two zones. While these zones are less liquid than Greater Goulburn their average 
trading volumes are much higher than those in the zones where trading activity is 
sporadic. Figure 2 presents a graph of the ML traded across the three zones, which 
illustrates the variability in the ML traded.  
 
 
4.  Demand and Supply Analysis 
 
For the three zones which have spans of data for three financial years for TWRDL the 
data is subjected to further analysis. For each week of trading it is possible to obtain 
data on the sell and buy orders lodged in that week.  For the analysis in this paper it is 
assumed that each lodged order represents the true value assigned to that quantity of 
water by the individual lodging that order. If that assumption holds then all of the 
offers trace out points which lie on the respective demand and supply curves for that 
week. The elasticity of demand (supply) can then be estimated via an OLS regression 
involving the logarithms of quantity of ML traded and the prices. This analysis is 
done for every week for which trading takes place and multiple offers exist to be able 
to estimate the demand and supply elasticities. For these three zones the results in 
table 4 report the minimum and maximum elasticity estimates, along with the simple 
average and a weighted average where the weights are calculated as a function of the 
ML traded. In addition table 4 also reports consumer and producer surplus for each of 
the zones, both the weekly average and the sum for all weeks. The consumer and 
producer surplus is calculated based on the assumption that lodged offer prices 
represent the true values of individuals. The difference between these and the 
established pool prices for that week are then multiplied by the relevant quantity to 
obtain the calculated surpluses. For the sake of completeness table 4 also includes the 
averages and ranges for prices and ML traded for the other three products traded in 
these zones as well as all other zones combined into two groups trading of temporary 
and permanent water rights. In calculating these surpluses no adjustments are made 
for the costs of transacting on the market. Details on the transaction costs are available 
on the website at: 
http://www.watermove.com.au/aboutwatertrading.asp#terms_and_conditions 
 
An analysis of the results in table 4 reveals the following patterns. There is a 
considerable range in the demand elasticities across all three trading zones, although 
the simple average estimated demand elasticity is failry comparable across the three 
zones. In fact, when the volume weighted average elasticity is calculated across all the 
three zones it is remarkably similar. In terms of supply elasticities the ranges for 
Greater Goulburn and Barmah-Nyah are similar, while the range for Hume-Barmah is 
more extreme. The extreme elasticities for Hume-Barmah are in weeks where trading 
and offers are thin, illustrating the concern of Crase, O’Reilly and Dollery (2000) about the thin markets. The estimated average (both simple and weighted) supply 
elasticity is lower in Greater Goulburn, even after the extreme observations are 
removed from the Hume-Barmah time series (three observations of estimated supply 
elasticities are removed). For the TWRDL trading in the three most active zones, 
figure 3 presents a time series plot of the estimated weekly demand and supply 
elastcities (with the three extreme Hume-Barmah observations removed). The figure 
shows the variable nature of the estimated weekly elasticities, in part induced by the 
thin trading effects mentioned in Crase, O’Reilly and Dollery (2000). Rolfe (2004) 
discusses that calculations of consumer and producer surplus are a means of 
measuring the economic gains from water trading. Heaney et. al. also discuss the 
economic gains from allowing inter-regional trade, and suggest that significant gains 
are likely to be present. Heaney et. al. (2004) assume that all gainful intra-regional 
trades have already occurred. This analysis provides some measure of these gains. In 
terms of consumer and producer surplus the results show significant economic gains 
on the basis of the assumptions made in the analysis. For Greater Goulburn the 
average weekly consumer and producer surplus exceed $20,000 respectively, and 
cumulate to amounts in excess of $2.5 million, respectively for the whole sample 
period. While the results for Barmah-Nyah are less spectacular they are still quite 
sizable at average weekly surpluses of around $4000 respectively, and cumulative 
sums for the whole sample period of around $500,000 each. For Hume-Barmah the 
results are a little less around $2000 on average per week, and cumulative sums of 
around $170,000. Figure 4 presents a time series plot of the calculated consumer and 
producer surpluses on a weekly basis for the whole sample period.  
 
For the TWRDL trading in the most active three trading zones further analysis is then 
conducted on the elasticities and surpluses. Specifically, for each zone the following 
four regression models are estimated: 
 
DdElas = α1 SsElas + α2 ConsSurp + α3 ProdSurp + α4 Price + α5 ML Traded +α6 
DdElas (-1) + α7 Trweek + ε 
 
SsElas = α1 DdElas + α2 ConsSurp + α3 ProdSurp + α4 Price + α5 ML Traded +α6 
SsElas (-1) + α7 Trweek + ε 
 
ConsSurp = α1 SsElas + α2 DdElas + α3 ProdSurp + α4 Price + α5 ML Traded +α6 
ConsSurp (-1) + α7 Trweek + ε 
 
ProdSurp = α1 SsElas + α2 ConsSurp + α3 DdElas + α4 Price + α5 ML Traded +α6 
ProdSurp (-1) + α7 Trweek + ε 
 
where DdElas is the estimated demand elasticity, SsElas is the estimated supply 
elasticity, ConsSurp  is the calculated consumer surplus, ProdSurp is the calculated 
producer surplus, Price is the weekly pool price, ML traded is the quantity of ML 
traded for that week and Trweek is the number of trading weeks that the exchange has 
been in operation. Each of the models is also augmented with a set of dummy 
variables for the financial years, and for the months of the year 
 
The results of estimating each of these models for each of the trading zones are 
reported in tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively. Two specifications are reported, both with 
and without the year and month dummy variables. The tables report OLS parameter estimates, OLS p-values in parantheses, White (1980) p-values in brackets, as well as 
the adjusted R-squared, Durbin-Watson test and White (1980) test. The Durbin-
Watson test is used with a lagged dependent variable following the findings of Inder 
(1984, 1986) which support the use of the test provided that the correct critical value 
is used. The results reveal the following patterns. For the models of demand 
elasticities across the three trading zones there are no variables which are consistently 
significant across all specifications. In Greater Goulburn and Barmah-Nyah the 
trading week is significant in the specification without dummies, but this result 
disappears when the dummy variables are added. A similar pattern is found for the 
lagged dependent variable for Greater Goulburn and Hume-Barmah. In contrast, the 
results for the models of supply elasticities are much stronger. In all three trading 
zones, producer surplus is found to be significantly negative, while price and volume 
are found to be significantly positive. These results hold true for specifications with 
and without dummy variables, and for either conventional or White (1980) standard 
errors. Higher prices and volumes, but lower producer surplus is found to be 
associated with higher supply elasticities. For the models of consumer surplus, a 
significantly positive volume effect is found across all trading zones and all 
specifications. For Greater Goulburn there is a positive price effect in the model 
without dummies, and for Hume-Barmah there is a negative trading week effect in the 
model without dummies, however neither of these results are robust to the inclusion 
of the dummy variables. For the producer surplus models there are a number of 
variables which are significant. In general supply elasticity is significantly negative, 
while price and volume are significantly positive. This is consistent with the broad 
result found in the models of supply elasticity.  
 
The estimated models are now augmented to analyse whether there are spillover 
effects across the three trading zones. Specifically, if we are estimating the model for 
the demand elasticity for one zone, the demand elasticities for the other two trading 
zones are then added as explanatory variables. A similar approach is taken for each of 
the other variables of interest. The results of this estimation are reported in tables 8, 9 
and 10, respectively. The first issue that arises in the analysis is whether any spillover 
effects are present. For Greater Goulburn which is the most liquid of the trading zones 
there is no evidence of spillover from Hume-Barmah or Barmah-Nyah. For the 
Barmah-Nyah trading zone there is no evidence of spillovers on the consumer and 
producer surplus measures. However, for the elasticity model there is evidence of 
spillover effects. For the demand elasticity this is only from Greater Goulburn, while 
for the supply elasticity spillover effects are found from both the Greater Goulburn 
and Hume-Barmah trading zones. For Hume-Barmah the results are even more mixed. 
For both the consumer and producer surplus analysis there is spillover from Barmah-
Nyah in the models without the dummy variables. For the demand elasticity there is 
spillover from Greater Goulburn for all model specifications, while for the supply 
elasticity there is spillover from Barmah-Nyah for all model specifications. In 
summary the results show some relationships between the three trading zones. The 
second issue that arises in the analysis is whether the impacts found to be significant 
in the models without spillover effects are still present once such effects are allowed 
in the modelling. In general, this is found to be the case.  
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has conducted an analysis of the water markets in Victoria covered by 
Watermove. The analysis in this paper has examined the weekly trading activity. For 
the majority of trading zones there is little trading activity that occurs. There are three 
trading zones in which the markets for temporary water rights are reasonably active 
and liquid on a weekly basis, and for these zones an analysis was conducted of their 
demand and supply elasticities and consumer and producer surplus. The results of this 
analysis suggest a stronger relationship on the supply side between prices, volumes, 
elasticity and producer surplus. While trade is relatively limited, the stronger 
relationship on the supply side indicates that sellers are taking into account the 
marginal benefits of water usage on farm compared with trading via the market.   
Specifically, given the three more active trading zones that formed the basis of this 
analysis are located in areas where irrigation was established under the trust system 
during the 1880s. The extent of environmental degradation in these zones is 
considerable with shallow water tables being the dominant problem.  In addition, 
much of the irrigated production in these areas is concentrated on pastures and fodder 
crops, and cereals that generally have a low return per acre.  As a result, because 
shallow water tables decrease the lands productivity, the returns from which are 
relatively low compared with grapes or citrus it would be logical to conclude that 
farmers in these areas would incorporate the marginal benefits of water used in 
farming compared with that traded thereby increasing their responsiveness to price 
and volume changes on the supply side.  Put simply, as wealth maximising 
individuals farmers would be aware that return on water is higher in trading compared 
with putting the water to use in irrigation thereby encouraging sellers to increase 
volumes traded as prices increased.  Given trade between zones is restricted, there is 
not a similar level of responsiveness on the demand side because the cost of water is 
relatively high compared with returns from production.  As a result, trading is being 
driven by supply side considerations.  In light of this argument, it could be argued that 
farmers consider the wealth limiting effects of degradation in their decisions engage 
in water trading.  In turn, the move of water out of areas dominated by shallow water 
tables and low valued crops would indicate that there will be significant 
environmental benefits forthcoming from increased water trade as demonstrated by 
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 Table 1: Water Regions and Trading Zones 
 
This table presents details on the number of trading zones and products traded for 
each of the six regions in Watermove. 
 
Region  No. of trading zones  Products traded 
Northern Victoria 
Groundwater 
14 TWRDL,  TS 
Northern Victoria 
Regulated 




15  TWRDL, TS, PWRDL, 
PUWRDL 
Southern New South 
Wales 
2  TWRDL, TS, THS, TGS 
Southern Victoria 
Regulated 
9  TWRDL, TS, PWRDL, 
PUWRDL 
Wimmera  Mallee  1  TWRDL, TS, PWRDL, 
PUWRDL 
 Table 2: Northern Victoria Regulated Zones with Limited Trading Activity 
 
This table presents details on the number of trading weeks, and ranges for prices and 
ML traded for the zones and products with limited trading activity (9 weeks or less) in 
















PWRDL 2  1100.50 1250  20  23 
Pyramid 
Boort 
PUWRDL  2 1149.50  1150  5 5 
Central 
Goulburn 
PUWRDL 1  1238  1238  19  19 
Broken 
NCW 
TWRDL 1  78.5  78.5  100  100 
Broken 
CWGR 
TWRDL  9 48  201.75  4 59.4 
Lower 
Goulburn 
TWRDL  9 15  435  9 185 
Campaspe 
 
TWRDL 9  65  403.25  10  200 
Loddon 
 
TWRDL 3  50  450  10  15 
Hume 
Barmah 
PUWRDL  9 930  1200  4 124 
Hume 
Barmah 
PWRDL  2 1000  1000  2 40 
Barmah 
Nyah 
PUWRDL  7 1150  1220  4 15 
 Table 3: Summary Statistics on Water Trading 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the number of trading weeks, prices and ML traded for the three trading zones and six products in the 
Northern Victoria Regulated region for which trading is reasonably consistent. For completeness the summary statistics for the other zones are 





























TWRDL       108 8 3 12 500 174.27  148.09  100  4111.8 1447.77
Greater 
Goulburn 
PUWRDL  17              48 17 1100  1250 1176.56 1188.96 2 60 13.59
Hume 
Barmah 
TWRDL                  85 36 9 22.50 310.55 131.72 101.20 9 1015 226.92
Hume 
Barmah 
TS                    21 12 11 57.50 305 213.35 189.33 5 155.2 50.69
Barmah 
Nyah 
TWRDL                  118 11 1 11 306.50 132.91 144.02 5 1135.1 311.69
Barmah 
Nyah 
TS            35 2 7 37.50 276.27 199.23  220.02  2.3 413 121.61
Other 
 
Temporary              13 1050  177.10  116.47  4 300 48.40
Other 
 
Permanent            930  1250  1132.73 1090.41 2 124 27.29
 Table 4: Elasticities and Surpluses for Trading Zones 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the estimated elasticities and calculated surpluses for the three trading zones and six products in the 
Northern Victoria Regulated region for which trading is reasonably consistent. For completeness the summary statistics on surpluses for the 
other zones are also reported. For Hume-Barmah the figures in parantheses are for supply elasticities with those observations where the 




Product DdElas  DdElas

























TWRDL                        0.80 7.56 3.20 3.53 0.18 13.26 3.50 3.71 24575 2654191 28708 3100513
Greater 
Goulburn 
PUWRDL                 200.88  3415 195.88  3330
Hume 
Barmah 




2081.93 176494 1960.54 166646
Hume 
Barmah 
TS                851.52  17882  1629.91 34228
Barmah 
Nyah 
TWRDL                      0.68 12.29 3.49 3.51 0.36 16.36 4.21 4.96 3579.54 422386 4303.44 507805
Barmah 
Nyah 
TS               2057.4  72009  3012.63 105442
Other 
 
Temporary                 209.14  9202 256.32  11278
Other 
 
Permanent                 375.42  9010 150.63  3615
 Table 5: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Greater Goulburn Region 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
 
              DdElas  SsElas  ConsSurp  ProdSurp  Price ML LDep Trweek  Adj. R2  DW White
















































SsElas          0.101
(0.425) 
[0.343] 



















SsElas (d)  0.064 
(0.657) 
[0.619] 



















































































































Table 6: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Barmah-Nyah region 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
            DdElas  SsElas  ConsSurp  ProdSurp  Price ML LDep Trweek  Adj. R2  DW White 






































































SsElas (d)  -0.076 
(0.526) 
[0.543] 



















































































































Table 7: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Hume-Barmah region 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
            DdElas  SsElas  ConsSurp  ProdSurp  Price ML LDep Trweek  Adj. R2  DW White 







































































SsElas (d)  -0.004 
(0.988) 
[0.981] 



















































































































Table 8: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Greater Goulburn region with spillovers 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
                    DdElas SsElas ConsSurp ProdSurp  Price ML LDep Trweek HB BN Adj.R2 DW White 











































































































































































































































Table 9: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Barmah-Nyah region with spillovers 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
 DdElas  SsElas  ConsSurp ProdSurp  Price  ML  LDep  Trweek  GG  HB  Adj.R2 DW  White 













































































































































































































































Table 10: Models for Elasticities and Surpluses for the Hume-Barmah region with spillovers 
 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates. OLS p-values are reported in parantheses, while White corrected p-values are reported in brackets. 
                      DdElas SsElas ConsSurp ProdSurp  Price ML LDep Trweek GG BN Adj.R2 DW White 


































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Graph of consumer and producer surplus across the trading zones 
 
 